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In January 2005, The Economist published a survey on corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), joining a long-running debate on the meaning and need for CSR in a 
market economy. The British weekly’s thesis, widely accepted among economists, was first 
stated years ago by Milton Friedman (1962): a firm that maximizes its profits while acting 
within the law and the ethical rules that are intrinsic to a market economy is fulfilling all of 
its social and moral responsibilities and need not abide by any other type of constraint or 
demand. However, this thesis is disputed by many other authors. 
 
This article seeks to answer the question of whether there is a role for CSR in the 
economic paradigm. Obviously, it does not pretend to give a final answer but simply to set 
forth the reasons that will enable each person to arrive at his or her own answer. The first 
part discusses the economic arguments about maximizing value for the owner and society 
and viewing the firm as a nexus of contracts. The second part discusses the different 
arguments about the possible role of CSR in the economic paradigm. The article ends with 















































In January 2005, The Economist published a survey on corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), joining a long-running debate on the meaning and need for CSR in a 
market economy. The British weekly’s thesis, widely accepted among economists,
2 was first 
stated years ago by Milton Friedman (1962):
3 a firm that maximizes its profits while acting 
within the law and the ethical rules that are intrinsic to a market economy is fulfilling all of 
its social and moral responsibilities and need not abide by any other type of constraint or 
demand. However, this thesis is disputed by many other authors. 
 
This article seeks to answer the question of whether there is a role for CSR in the 
economic paradigm. Obviously, it does not pretend to give a final answer but simply to set 
forth the reasons that will enable each person to arrive at his or her own answer. The first 
part discusses the economic arguments about maximizing value for the owner and society 
and viewing the firm as a nexus of contracts. The second part discusses the different 
arguments about the possible role of CSR in the economic paradigm. The article ends with 
the conclusions.      
 
 
The purpose of the firm in the economic paradigm 
 
Maximizing value for the owner 
 
In the theory of the firm, it is common to start with the hypothesis that the firm acts 
“as if” its managers’ goal were to maximize profits (or the firm’s value for the owner)
4 
(Friedman 1953). We may accept or reject that hypothesis as a description of the way firms 
behave, but what interests us here is its normative content, i.e. the argument that firms must 
always act that way. Why, for example, does Friedman say (1962, p. 133) that “there is one 
                                                 
1 This paper is part of the research work of IESE’s Ethics and Economics Chair. I would like to thank the 
Fundación José y Ana Royo for its financial support and Professors S. Ramakrishna Velamuri, Joan Enric 
Ricart and Nuria Mas for their input. This subject has been discussed previously in Argandoña (2003b). A 
simplified version of this paper is forthcoming in Papeles de Economía Española under the title “Economía de 
mercado y responsabilidad social de la empresa” (Market economy and corporate social responsibility).    
2 Two excellent examples are Henderson (2001) and Sternberg (1994).  
3 His best known article on the subject is Friedman (1970). 
4 From now on, when we talk about maximizing value, we mean maximizing value for the owner or 




and only one responsibility of business – to use its resources and engage in activities 
designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to 
say, engages in open and free competition without deception or fraud”?
5  
 
The answer to this question is to be found in a feature of human behavior that is 
basic to the economic paradigm:
6 the “economic principle” (Mises 1949) or efficiency 
principle, which says that human beings always try to obtain the best results with the scarce 
resources available – or minimize the resources used to achieve a desired goal. This 
principle is based on the conception of the economic agent as an evaluating, maximizing, 
resourceful person




The same applies to economic institutions and organizations, both those created as 
spontaneous orders (such as the market) and those created by human design (such 
as  companies): it is assumed that they all pursue maximum efficiency, measured as the 
difference (or quotient) between the results achieved and the opportunity cost of the resources 
used. This is why it is said that the social function of economic institutions and organizations 
such as the market and the firm is to create wealth – or rather, the greatest possible creation of 
wealth given prevailing constraints (for example, available resources and information and the 
economic agents’ preferences): in other words, maximum efficiency. 
 
How is this achieved? Economics shows that, in general equilibrium and under 
certain conditions, maximum efficiency (a Pareto optimum) is obtained when firms maximize 
their profits,
9 or rather, when managers maximize the value of capital for the owners (the 
value of the stock in the case of a public corporation).
10  Hence the conclusion that firms must 
maximize this value: being economic institutions, it is their only responsibility because, by 
abiding by it, they are optimizing their contribution to society. And any other responsibility 
that prevents them from maximizing value will be undesirable.
11  
 
                                                 
5 Other classic references are Arrow (1973) and Hayek (1960). There exists an obvious relationship between 
what is said in the text and the definition of economics as the science that addresses that aspect of conduct that 
arises from the scarcity of means to achieve given ends (Robbins 1932, p. 24).    
6 Obviously, there is not “one” economic paradigm but many. The paradigm presented here is that of 
“neoclassical economics” and is that which best aligns with Friedman’s thesis mentioned previously – and, 
of  course, does not give due justice to other proposals. The Austrian alternative is particularly worth 
mentioning; see Huerta de Soto (1999).  See Sison (1995) for an excellent discussion of these subjects.   
7 This is the REMM model (resourceful, evaluating, maximizing man) described in Brunner & Meckling 
(1977) and Meckling (1976). This paper will not enter into any discussion of this anthropological principle, 
which would take us too far from our purpose.   
8 I say “in principle”, because the anthropological assumptions on which this theory is based have been the 
subject of considerable argument. It can also be viewed as a requirement of rationality: “To the classical 
economists, rationality (a term they never used) meant preferring more to less, choosing the highest rate of 
return, minimizing unit costs and, above all, pursuing one’s self interest without explicit regard to the welfare 
of others” (Blaug 1980, p. 229; cf. Gómez Biscarri 2000).   
9 See Winch (1971) for a demonstration and discussion of these conditions; the classic reference is Arrow 
(1968). The thesis that maximizing shareholder value is also an ethical mandate (Primeaux and Stieber 1994) 
is based on this argument.  
10 This applies in an environment with uncertainty, when decision-making in the firm is separate from 
ownership, the capital stock is endogenous and the decision is part of an intertemporal process. Cf., for 
example, Mossin (1977).  
11 The first theorem of welfare economics, which shows that a competitive equilibrium is a Pareto optimum 
(Arrow 1968), is equivalent to introducing the “invisible hand” in the process (Arrow and Hahn 1971, Hahn 
1973). Using this theory, as any resource distribution can lead to a Pareto optimum, a “division of labor” can 
be performed between the efficiency criterion (guaranteed by the conditions of the competitive equilibrium) 
and the fairness criterion (by varying the initial distribution of resources, so that the optimum is obtained with 
the desired income distribution). This solves the problem (at least, in theory) of fairness in distribution. Cf. 




The conditions that must be met for value maximization to achieve the optimum 
are, basically, the existence of perfect competition in all markets (the goods and factors are 
identical in each market; there is free exchange, free entry and exit; buyers and sellers have 
perfect information about the price and about the features and availability of goods and 
factors; and neither buyers nor sellers can influence the price), and the absence of public 
goods and external effects (so that prices fully reflect all the costs and social benefits).
12  
 
Of course, these conditions are never met, but the results may be corrected by 
regulations that reduce market power, increase available information, eliminate entry and 
exit barriers, provide public goods, correct external effects, etc. – regulations that, at least in 
theory, may come close to the optimum obtained in competitive conditions. In any case, 
even if the conditions for an optimum are not met due to imperfections in the regulations, 
there is no reason to believe that the instruments of CSR (which replace public regulations 
by private agreements, voluntary codes of conduct, supervision by non-governmental 
organizations, etc.) will improve the social outcome. 
 
Friedman’s thesis, therefore, is not arbitrary. In short, it is equal to saying that the 
firm’s purpose, as an economic institution, is to contribute to the system’s maximum 
efficiency and this is attained when the difference between the value generated by the firm 
and the opportunity cost of the resources used by the firm is maximal – and this difference, 




Maximizing social value 
 
What the conditions for the competitive optimum imply, in short, is that it is 
necessary to maximize the “social value” (Jensen 2001), which will be given by the 
difference between the (subjective) value that consumers attribute to the product or service 
produced and the opportunity cost of producing it, when the value includes all the (net) 
positive features for society and the cost includes all the opportunity costs incurred by 
society (Salas 2004). In other words, the maximum social value will match (approximately) 
the maximization of the consumer’s and producer’s surpluses in all the goods, services and 
resources markets, irrespective of who appropriates these surpluses. 
 
The consumer’s surplus is maximized when, given the consumer’s preferences and 
the product’s price, the utility obtained from each unit consumed is maximal. And the 
producer’s surplus is maximized when, given the technology available and the prices of the 
product and the factors, the production costs for society are minimal. However, maximizing 
value requires appropriating at least part of both surpluses and this may entail non-
optimization of social value. Without aiming to cover all the possible cases, let us see how 
this can happen in four specific situations. 
  
The first case consists of appropriation of the consumer’s surplus by the firm 
producing the good or service. This appropriation is maximal with perfect price 
discrimination. However, this is only possible under monopoly conditions – with partial 
appropriation in conditions of imperfect competition. Any limitation in competition implies 
a reduction in the quantity supplied in order to increase the price (except in the case of 
“perfect discrimination”), and this reduces the consumer’s surplus, which takes us away 
from the optimum. Therefore, maximizing value may not be compatible with the social 
optimum. Hence the perfect competition condition we stated earlier. 
                                                 
12 In short, these are not conditions imposed on the firm but on the market, which must be the mechanism (the 
“invisible hand”: Smith 1776) coordinating the decisions implemented by firms. 
13 It is not necessary for the firm to know exactly the value it creates. It is sufficient to offer the right incentives 




The second case is parallel to the first case but now the producer’s surplus is 
appropriated by the seller. Total appropriation is only possible in monopsony conditions in 
factor markets with price discrimination – with partial appropriation in conditions of 
imperfect competition in these markets. However, this implies limiting the demand for 
factors to reduce their price, which, again, is incompatible with the social optimum. Again, 
this case invokes the condition of perfect competition in all markets. 
 
The third case refers to the generation of the producer’s surplus when there are 
(positive or negative) external effects in production, so that the producer does not bear all 
the costs (or receive all the benefits) associated with her action but instead passes on part of 
her costs (or benefits) to third parties not directly involved in the operation, such as the 
environment (pollution), the local community (traffic congestion, employee training) or 
society in general (spillover effects of the company’s research activities). In addition, this 
result may be enhanced by the incentives created in the process of the firm’s appropriation 
of the producer’s surplus (for example, incentives to offload pollution onto the environment 
or to not carry out research that would be socially optimal). In short, this explains why 
social and private costs must be identical in order for value maximization to lead to 
maximum efficiency. 
 
The fourth case addresses complex forms of cooperation between production 
factors (and between firms) to create capacities within the firm that enable maximization of 
the consumer’s and producer’s surpluses. In conventional economics, the existence 
of perfect information eliminated any competitive advantage, so that any product could be 
replaced perfectly by others in competitive conditions and all factors were remunerated in 
accordance with their contribution to production (the value of their marginal product). 
 
However, if we drop the perfect knowledge assumption, the possibility of 
generating innovations that contribute social value (in the form of increased value for the 
consumer or lower cost for the producer) leads to cooperation among production factors that 
invest in specific assets (physical, human or organizational), forming teams whose members 
may include customers, suppliers, employees, managers, investors, etc. This enables 
optimization of value creation and cost reduction (obtaining competitive advantages) but 
raises new problems: appropriation of the quasi-rents generated, risk management and 
decision-making within the firm.   
 
Let us suppose, for example, that an employee or manager has accumulated 
specific human capital (for example, knowledge of the firm’s internal processes, its 
customers’ preferences, in-house technology, etc.). This increases the firm’s return because 
it increases the consumer’s surplus (the consumer is willing to pay more for the goods) or 
the producer’s surplus (because costs are reduced or productivity is increased). 
Consequently, this human capital generates quasi-rents whose amount will be governed, in 
static terms, by the difference between the value of the employee’s marginal productivity 
and the wage he could command in an alternative occupation.
14 
 
The example of the employee investing in specific human capital is readily 
generalizable. The firm also accumulates specific physical capital, whose return would be 
substantially less if it were to be used to produce other goods, in another location, or using 
some other technology or organizational form. Suppliers also develop human, physical and 
organizational capital whose return would be less if it were to be used outside of the 
relationship with the firm
15 – and much the same may be true of customers. Even investors 
                                                 
14 And other lesser items, such as the costs of severance payments and the costs of searching and training a 
new employee for the firm, and the costs of changing job for the employee.   
15 The extreme case could be that of a supplier that provides a specific, differentiated product or service to a 




may develop specific capital if they use their knowledge of the firm to compare its value 
creation capacity with that of other investment options.
16 
 
And both the firm and the other stakeholders will have incentives to appropriate the 
quasi-rents that have been created in this manner. In the example of the employee who 
acquired specific human capital, the firm may offer him the lowest wage required to prevent 
him from leaving to join another firm and continue accumulating specific capital, while the 
employee may demand the highest wage that enables him to keep his job without being 
dismissed and being replaced by another employee.
17 What effects will this conflict have on 
the creation of social value and, therefore, on the thesis that maximizing value maximizes 




The firm as a nexus of contracts 
 
If a firm is to be managed so as to maximize value for its owners, does that mean 
that the owners receive preferential treatment? The answer given by economics is no: the 
goal is to obtain maximum economic efficiency and this is the way to do it. In any case, the 
other stakeholders are protected by contracts signed with the firm, as employees, lenders, 
suppliers, customers, etc., including implicit contracts, such as those that bind the firm to the 
local community or society in general. And, again, observance of the law that regulates 
contracts is a necessary condition for maximizing efficiency.
19 
 
The existence of contracts must simultaneously solve 1) the problem of decision-
making (who decides what must be done to maximize value) and the resulting control or 
monitoring by stakeholders (the problem of “corporate governance”), 2) the problem of 
distributing the value produced, and 3) the problem of risk management by all the 
stakeholders (Boatright 2002, Bradley et al. 1999, Masten 1988). 
 
According to the contractual theory of the firm, the owners contract with the 
(internal and external) stakeholders the terms on which they will contribute to the 
production of goods and services in the firm, in return for a pre-established remuneration. 
This solves the problem of distributing the value of the output: if the contracts are voluntary 
and free, each contractual stakeholder receives the share that has been agreed, while the 
non-contractual stakeholders also receive a pre-established share (for example, the State 
collects taxes) and the owners receive the residue (Rappaport 1998).
20 The same applies to 
ordinary risks: the contractual stakeholders receive their risk-free remuneration, while all 
the residual risk is borne by the owners. If the owners accept the profit and the residual risk, 
then they are responsible to the other stakeholders, through market or internal control 
mechanisms (Easterbrook and Fischel 1991, Jensen 2001), for decision-making (which they 
will delegate to managers, through an agency agreement)
21 and monitoring. 
 
                                                 
16 Jensen (2001) points out that investors must learn how to value the firm’s intangible assets.   
17 This subject has also been discussed in finance theory (cf. Rajan and Zingales 2003). The problem is more 
general, because all those who take part in production will want to appropriate all rents that may be generated, 
including those of location, market power, specialization, etc. 
18 For an excellent discussion, see Arruñada (1998).    
19 This is simply a consequence of the theorem that when value for the owner is maximized, value for all the 
owners of rights on the firm is also maximized (Fama and Miller 1972). This also requires perfect contracts 
and perfect financial markets (in addition to competition, absence of external effects, etc.).  
20 Fulfillment of the contract is essential, as, if the owners try to maximize the residue, they will want to 
minimize payments to the stakeholders. 
21 The problems entailed by this agency contract are well-known but not relevant to the argument proposed 




However, the answer is not so simple when there are incomplete contracts (due to 
information asymmetries, fraud, etc., that the law cannot prevent), when there are external 
effects (i.e. when the contracts affect stakeholders who are not party to the contractual 
relationship) (Bradley et al. 1999), or when investments are made in specific (human, 
physical or financial) capital,
22 as the distribution of the quasi-rents will have effects on the 
parties involved (Brickley et al. 2000). 
 
Indeed, in a team, each member’s contribution to the overall result can only be 
determined by considering the performance of the team as a whole: it is not possible to 
remunerate each member in accordance with the value of her marginal productivity because 
that marginal productivity is not independent of that of the other members, of the entire 
team or of the firm as a whole. Therefore, the contract must maintain the incentive to 
cooperate, so that value is maximized and the stakeholders’ interests are not harmed. 
 
On the other hand, all those who provide specific capital, regardless of its nature, run 
a risk that cannot always be diversified (by, for example, transferring it to the owners of the 
firm’s capital), because they have all made specific investments that lose value outside of the 
firm and, as we have seen, may be appropriated by other stakeholders (Kaufman et al. 2003). 
 
In any case, the contracts must be complete, in the sense that all the parties affected 
by the firm’s decisions are included in the network of contracts that constitutes the firm. 
And this condition may not be met in at least two senses: first, when the non-contractual 
stakeholders bear part of the external costs (and profits) (for example, due to pollution 
caused by the firm) and bear a risk on their assets, and, second, when there are parties who 
are not represented in these contracts (for example, future generations). This again argues in 
favor of a role for laws and regulations. 
 
In short, the thesis that making decision and monitoring the execution of such 
decisions are the responsibility of the owners of capital is based on the assumption that there 
is an optimal contract structure that minimizes transaction costs, settles internal conflicts 
regarding the distribution of quasi-rents and is compatible with optimization of social value 
(Gibbons 2004).
23 However, it is impossible to distribute the quasi-rents a priori, before the 
provision of specific capital, because this generates free-rider behaviors. Neither can it be 
left for a negotiation a posteriori, when production has already been carried out, because this 
favors continuous reopening of the battle for the distribution of the quasi-rents. And, of 
course, it does not take into account the interests of those not included in the contracts, 
unless they are protected by law. 
 
A number of solutions have been proposed for this problem. One of them is to 
create corporate governance mechanisms with the participation of all those affected by the 
problem (at least those who provide specific human or physical capital, and extracontractual 
stakeholders affected, for example, by externalities). This contradicts the thesis that 
monitoring should be performed by the owners with the sole goal of maximizing value for 
them.
24 
                                                 
22 The “specific assets” addressed by these investments may be very varied, depending on the type of 
specificity: location, physical, human capital, “dedicated” assets, “co-specialized” assets, etc. Cf. Arruñada 
(1998), chap. 4, for a study of these assets within the firm, and chap. 5 for the relationships with customers and 
suppliers.  
23 Gibbons (2004) points out that the contract structure may settle disputes about the physical (disposable) 
capital, but not about the human capital or about the incentives for contractors outside of the firm (mainly 
suppliers and customers), because they possess specific assets whose value is modified by the firm’s decisions 
and this value cannot be protected in a contract. Furthermore, (vertical) integration of these contractors outside 
of the firm does not solve the problem of the pursuit of quasi-rents, because the problems of “haggling/politics 
are inescapable problems in any governance structure” (Gibbson 2004, p. 35).  




Another solution, proposed by Jensen (2001), is to broaden the maximization of 
value to include not only the value captured by the owners of capital but also all of the 
firm’s financial rights, including those of lenders, investors, etc. However, this only solves 
the problem for those who provide financing, not for the owners of specific human capital 
nor (necessarily) for outside suppliers and customers. 
 
It should also be borne in mind that formal contracts are not the only possible way 
of addressing relationships within the firm and between the firm and its environment, which 
raises the possibility of “relational contracts” (Baker et al. 2002). These are informal 
agreements between parties, who undertake to abide by them (they are self-enforceable) due 
to the high cost that non-performance will have for their future relations, even though the 
agreements could not be enforced, for example, before a court. There are many relationships 
of this type, both within firms and with other stakeholders: unwritten codes of conduct, 
implicit agreements between managers and employees, informal relationships between 
suppliers and customers, or between companies operating in the same industry, etc. And all 
of them are based, in one way or another, on trust because they address the prospect of a 
long-term relationship, in which decisions made in the present affect the future (for 
example, by changing the incentives to invest in specific assets). In other words, they 
presuppose the existence of ethics.    
     
 
 
Is there a role for corporate social responsibility? 
 
If the above discussion adequately addresses the strengths and weaknesses of the 
economic paradigm, can there be a role for CSR? The discussion on this subject is 
complicated by the absence of any precise definition of CSR and, in particular, by the 
existence of very different positions, based on different conceptions of what can be expected 
from the firm and from its role in society. 
 
As a provisional starting point, I shall take a couple of broad and quite similar 
definitions of CSR. The first is given by the European Commission (2001, p. 7): “a concept 
whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations 
and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis”. The second is given by 
David Vogel (2004, p. 3): “policies and programs of private firms that go beyond legal 
requirements as a response to public pressures and societal expectations”. As we shall see in 
the course of this discussion, this “voluntary integration” and these “policies and programs”, 
also voluntary, constitute an ethical requirement that must be fulfilled by the firm, beyond 
the “social and environmental concerns” and the “pressures and expectations of society”.    
 
 
Social responsibility and the goal of the firm 
  
As we have already said, the purpose of the firm is efficiency. But should 
economic institutions be governed solely by the efficiency criterion or are there other 
dimensions that are also important? The production and sale of goods and services with 
economic efficiency is, without doubt, an extremely important social function of the firm, 
but is it its only purpose? 
 
The answer is probably no. From the viewpoint of positive science, it cannot be 
said that there are institutions that are purely economic but rather that there are institutions 
or organizations with economic, political, or ethical dimensions.
25 Thus, the firm is not only 
                                                 




an economic institution but also a sociological, cultural, political and ethical institution, 
encompassed within a variety of disciplines, with different approaches and models, in terms 
of efficiency, but also in terms of power, conflict, legitimacy, social demands, meaning, 
culture,… (Lozano 2000). 
 
Viewed in this light, CSR could be seen as a reminder, on a normative level, of the 
existence of these other dimensions, which must also be present in the firm:
26 for example, 
respect for its employees’ dignity, solving conflicts within the firm and with its 
environment, etc. To an extent, it could be said that these are demands placed upon the firm 
as a human organization, even before we consider it as an economic organization focused on 
achieving maximum efficiency. In synthesis, the above considerations take us towards a 
concept of CSR that overlaps with that of ethics, connecting with Friedman’s thesis 
mentioned at the beginning.
27  
 
In any case, this criterion would not be applicable to the versions of CSR which 
stress its voluntary nature, which would only be acceptable if the firm’s managers have its 
owners’ explicit or implicit authorization to carry them out, in accordance with criteria other 
than that of efficiency.
28    
 
 
Social responsibility and efficiency  
    
The argument we have just presented can be formulated in an alternative manner 
with respect to the efficiency concept, that is, that condition that characterizes the firm as an 
economic institution and which legitimizes its social function. In the economic paradigm, 
efficiency in the firm is defined and measured in terms of the income statement, that is, 
including only what appears in present and future inflows and outflows (ends and means), 
measured in monetary terms or convertible to them. 
 
And this would be the appropriate measure if they were the only relevant factors, 
that is, if there were no other ends different from those which can be evaluated in terms of 
the firm’s income and no other means except those whose costs are included in the 
calculation of the firm’s net earnings. That is, if it was not necessary to take into account 
aspects that cannot be measured in money terms, such as the agents’ acquisition of attitudes 




From this viewpoint, the role of CSR could be as a reminder of the existence of 
other ends and other means, of other “revenues” and other “costs”, including, for example, 
                                                 
26 This is the conception of business “in” society developed by Lozano (2004).  
27 For a brief review of the different ethical theories of CSR, see Garriga and Melé (2004).  
28 Avi-Yonah (2005) points out that there is a conception of the firm, which he calls “real” and considers to be 
dominant, under which managers would be authorized by the company, and often by its owners too, to carry 
out this type of voluntary CSR activities, even when they are incompatible with maximizing value.    
29 As Illanes explains (1994, p. 31), “efficiency is a quality that people talk about when the question is ‘what is 
it useful for’ or ‘what is it valid for’, that is, when we place ourselves in the context of the connection or 
relationship between means and ends. Hence the complexity of any efficiency statement, and, above all, of any 
efficiency statement that goes beyond the technical level in its strict or restricted sense, that is, it does not 
confine itself to indicating the capacity of a certain means to produce a certain end (...). For this reason, a 
discourse which is conducted in terms of efficiency is an incomplete discourse, suspended in a vacuum; or, in 
other cases, a discourse that does not make explicit its implicit elements because it presupposes a certain end, 
even though sometimes it does not clearly state this”.  
30 Another problem, which I will not dwell on here, is that efficiency is defined in terms of a Pareto optimum, 
that is, a situation in which no-one can improve his welfare without diminishing another person’s welfare. 
However, the Pareto optimum is not neutral from an ethical viewpoint. Cf. Argandoña (1998), Buchanan 




changes in the preferences function induced by human decisions (Argandoña 2005) or the 
external (environmental, for example, but also moral) effects of decisions. To put it more 
bluntly: maximizing efficiency would indeed be an absolute optimum if it was possible to 
take into account all the –positive or negative– economic, political, social and moral effects 
on the agent who decides and on all of the other agents (present or future) over an unlimited 
time frame. However, this is not possible – among other reasons, because man is a free 
being. So we need rules, criteria and values, a moral framework to guide people in their 
actions. And this is the role of ethics.
31 So, CSR is once again identified with ethics.      
    
 
Social responsibility and profits 
 
The simplest instance of the acceptance of CSR would be that in which the firm 
exercises its social responsibility through the performance of actions that favor or, at least, 
do not prevent maximization of value for the owners (Avi-Yonah 2005, Mitchell et al. 1997, 
Odgen and Watson 1999) – which Jensen (2001) calls “enlightened” value creation.
32 This 
can happen, for example, when consumers are willing to pay a higher price because they 
perceive greater value in the goods and services obtained (for example, because the 
company protects the environment above and beyond what is required by law, or because it 
applies fair trade rules in its supplies), or when costs are reduced as a consequence of CSR 
actions (for example, because employees work harder or because regulation costs are 
decreased through the firm’s self-regulation in environmental issues). 
 
However, if firms seek to maximize value in their actions, and CSR is a party to 
this outcome, then CSR adds nothing of significance – unless it is interpreted as a means 
(among others) for identifying business opportunities, which implies ceasing to consider it 
as an exercise in social responsibility.
33 Of course, CSR can contribute to reducing costs or 
maximizing value, but this cannot be stated as a general rule. 
  
Furthermore, it is questionable to argue that firms with CSR maximize value just as 
well as other firms, or even better than them. In actual fact, there are all manner of 
combinations along a continuum between efficiency and responsibility; empirical results are 
not and never can be conclusive, and it is impossible to establish what is cause and what is 
effect.
34 In addition, if all firms were socially responsible, the benefits (in terms of product 
differentiation, for example, or lower production costs) that each would obtain from its 




Social responsibility and the conditions for a competitive optimum 
  
According to the arguments put forward by economists, if the conditions for a 
competitive optimum are met, there is no place for CSR. And if these conditions are not 
met, the creation of a legal and regulatory framework may guarantee achievement of those 
                                                 
31 This is why Argandoña (1989) states that ethics is the condition of equilibrium of all human systems. See 
also Huerta de Soto (1999) and his discussion of the role of ethics as a coordinator of decisions.   
32 Garriga and Melé (2004) include this conception among the instrumental theories of CSR, while Lozano 
(2004) includes it among the reactive theories.  
33 This leads Chandler (2003, p. 33) to describe this way of advocating CSR as “unreal and amoral”.  
34 Margolis and Walsh (2003) give an excellent summary of the attempts to find a relation between CSR and 
profits, and of the methodological and practical problems raised by these attempts.  
35 Which leads some to suspect that companies’ insistence on promoting CSR may have other goals, such as 
blocking the entry of competitors or avoiding regulation (The Economist 2005). When CSR becomes a social 




optimal results. And if this framework is sufficient, CSR will be unnecessary.
36 But if this is 
not so, then there is a role for CSR. For example, legislation is usually reactive (it addresses 
problems after they have appeared), while CSR can be proactive; the law is usually 
incomplete, because it does not consider all of the relevant details which CSR can take into 
account; regulation may give rise to problems, such as that of “capturing the regulator”, 
which CSR can avoid; etc. This leads us to view CSR as an exercise in the firm’s ethical 
responsibility, that is, as a moral duty. 
 
Consequently, CSR may be seen as a substitute for or a complement to legislation 
and regulation, even though it may be incompatible with maximizing value for the owners 
(Avi-Yonah 2005), provided that this takes us to a situation that is closer to maximizing 
social value.
37 In such cases, CSR would enable us to compensate for the lack of 
competition in the markets (for example, by paying above equilibrium wages in a job 
market in which the firm has monopsonistic powers), internalize external effects (by 
reducing pollution, improving product safety, etc.) or provide public goods by private means 
(by means of philanthropic actions).
38 
 
However, this proposal is not without problems. The first is that of incentives: why 
should a firm implement CSR criteria when this goes against the goal of maximizing value? 
In this case, it would be necessary to invoke ethics as a mandatory internal force, perhaps 
accompanied by the coercive role of social norms. 
 
There is another problem in this approach to the legitimacy of CSR: are firms better 
positioned than the legislator to determine the causes of deviations from the optimum and do 
they have the necessary means to correct such deviations? In principle, CSR is less effective 
and less efficient than regulation (Vogel 2004) because the firm does not always have the 
means for analysis, it does not have the global vision that is necessary when making decisions 
that affect society as a whole, and it cannot easily counteract the opportunistic behaviors (free 
riding) that may appear in self-regulation situations (Howard et al. 2000), etc.
39 Consequently, 
CSR actions cannot guarantee attainment of maximum efficiency, and often they cannot even 
guarantee that social welfare will grow (Kapstein 2001). 
 
In spite of this, CSR can complement regulation, particularly in those cases that 
cannot be included in the general rule,
40 or when, due to errors made by the State, the law or 
regulation falls short of the social optimum. Business practice shows that the strategies to 
address these problems may vary considerably, even within the same industry and 
geographical area, depending on the firm’s internal factors (Reinhardt 2004). This in turn 
supports the thesis that firms have a margin for addressing them with their own CSR 
strategies. 
 
                                                 
36 Abiding by the law is one responsibility of firms, but it is not part of CSR, which is voluntary, as we explain 
in the definitions given above.   
37 This could be regarded as the firm’s “primary” responsibility – to correct the “damage” (in a broad sense, as 
an impairment of social welfare) caused by its actions – as against its “secondary” responsibility to solve other 
problems in society that it has not caused but which we included earlier as voluntary actions. Cf. Preston and 
Post (1975), Wood (1991).  
38 How this is done and in what conditions it improves social welfare is not easy to determine. See Reinhardt 
(2004) for an excellent study of the problems created by the supposed internalization of external effects and 
the private provision of public goods.  
39 However, Porter and Kramer (2002) argue that firms can create more value in their philanthropic activities 
than governments or private donors, precisely because of their striving for economic efficiency.  
40 The employees and managers of an abattoir, for example, are likely to know better than the regulators about 
possible sources of contamination and will be able to cooperate with inspectors in establishing a health 
management system that is more suitable for internalizing external effects and reducing the costs of complying 




This brings us back to the consideration of CSR not as a specific responsibility 
dependent upon the “pressures and expectations of society”, according to Vogel’s definition 
(2004) given above, but as a further manifestation of the responsibility that all individuals 
and institutions have with respect to the consequences of their actions – a responsibility that 
is primarily ethical but which may also be legal (if it falls within the scope of the law) or 
social (if it is demanded by society), but which need not necessarily be concurrent with 
them.     
 
 
Social responsibility in the nexus of contracts 
 
In theory, tasks and quasi-rents within the firm (and between the firm and its 
closest external stakeholders, mainly customers and suppliers) may be distributed and 
coordinated by means of contracts. In practice, as we have already suggested, we have 
reason to believe that contracts may not be sufficient to develop, through investment in 
specific (physical, human and organizational) capital and in an atmosphere of cooperation 




This trust will be based, for example, on the conviction that relations within the 
firm are governed by fairness in the distribution of the quasi-rents generated, particularly 
when the cooperation is carried out in teams. Can contracts alone generate such trust? If the 
answer is no, then there is a role for CSR, even within the economic paradigm. And again, 
this role concurs with that of ethics. CSR can help create the necessary environment for the 
nexus of contracts to give rise to a social optimum and this is often what is pursued when it 
is proposed as a requisite for the effective functioning of organizations.
42 
 
Venkataraman (2002, p. 46) says that “the essence of the corporation is the 
competitive claims made of it by diverse stakeholders. It is a fact of business life that 
different stakeholders have different and often conflicting expectations of a corporation. 
Indeed, the firm itself can be said to be an invention to allow such conflict to be discovered, 
surfaced, and resolved, because conflicting claims have to be discovered and methods for 
resolution executed”. And not just for settling conflicts or distributing quasi-rents,
43 but for 
the creation of social value itself, which assumes cooperation between customers, suppliers, 
employees, managers, financial institutions and the firm (Barney 1991, Freeman 2004, Halal 
2001, Wernerfelt 1984). 
  
 
Social responsibility in the practice of business management 
 
There is one other area in which CSR may have a place, namely, within the praxis 
of management, because maximizing value for the owners is a methodological assumption 
used to explain how firms act (“as if” they maximized that value: Friedman 1953), and it 
could even be used as a criterion for assessing managers’ performance.
44 However, it is not 
an operational management principle – to say that marginal cost must be equal to marginal 
                                                 
41 From a sociological viewpoint, Sennett (1998) points out the limitations that a purely contractual approach 
may have on the development of human links within the firm.  
42 Rosanas (2004) explains the conditions that must exist, with bounded rationality, for trust to be created 
within an organization, when the agents act moved by “higher interests” and resist the temptation of 
opportunism. In such conditions, CSR (again, understood as an ethical responsibility) may enable an 
approximation to the social optimum in the long term. I would like to thank Prof. Joan E. Ricart for this point.   
43 This would be the approach to stakeholder theory in terms of interest alone, criticized by Melé (2002).  
44 The need for a single management assessment criterion has been put forward on many occasions; for 




revenue does not explain how decisions can be made within the firm. Therefore, managers 
may need a variety of criteria, principles and rules, which can include CSR. 
 
Indeed, some proposals about CSR view it as a management technique or 






Friedman (1970, p. 138) stated that the responsibility of the person on whom the 
firm’s management is conferred is “to conduct the business in accordance with [the 
owners’] desires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible while 
conforming to the basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those 
embodied in ethical custom”. This is a private normative argument – this is what managers 
have the obligation to do, in accordance with fairness criteria, because that is what the 




However, if Friedman can say that “the social responsibility of business is to 
increase its profits”, this is a social normative argument. The firm’s social function is 
economic efficiency: creating the maximum possible value, greater than what its 
stakeholders can achieve individually or through exchanges on the market (Aoki 1894, 
Kochan and Osterman 1994, Post et al. 2002).
46 
 
And, in spite of the numerous criticisms it has received, Friedman’s position is not 
arbitrary. The firm is an economic institution and, as such, it must apply efficiency criteria, 
which are part of its social function.
47 However, as we have already shown, these criteria are 
not sufficient by themselves. Does this mean that there is a role for CSR? My answer is yes, 
but not as often understood in books and articles on the subject. As a management 
technique, or as a voluntary activity allowed by owners, CSR needs no justification, but 
neither does it have any normative function. And whenever such a normative function is 
ascribed to it, whenever it is argued that firms must take CSR into account when performing 
their social function, we are identifying CSR with ethics. To put it rather bluntly and, 
probably, unfairly: CSR does not exist. What does exist is the firm’s responsibility, which is 
the same as that shared by all individuals and all organizations. And this responsibility is 
ethical (Freeman and Velamuri 2005). 
 
Does this take us back to Friedman’s thesis that the firm’s responsibility is 
efficiency, within the limits stipulated by law and, as we have just stressed, by ethics? Not 
exactly, for two reasons. First: Friedman views ethics as a series of social norms that are 
accepted for peaceful coexistence and to prevent deceit and fraud
48 (in short, a complement 
of the law insofar as the law cannot cover all the relevant situations) and not as a body of 
criteria, values and virtues for decision-making (Polo 1996). Consequently, his concept of 
ethics is insufficient as a guide for human decisions. 
                                                 
45 This is a deontological criterion, which must not be overlooked. Managers are using the owners’ resources 
and have a fiduciary undertaking to them to use these resources in accordance with the owners’ wishes and 
instructions (Boatright 1994, Hasnas 1998). However, what we are trying to show is that there are other 
arguments that go beyond this contractual duty and may even take precedence over it.     
46 This is the explanation of the existence of the firm given by Coase (1937). 
47 Velamuri and Venkataraman (2005) defend this position from the viewpoint of the employer’s function. For 
a discussion of the employer’s role in value creation, see also Freeman and Phillips (2002).  
48 Sternberg (1994) talks about decency (not lying, stealing or cheating, respecting shareholders’ ownership 
rights) and fairness (paying employees in line with their performance, promoting them on the basis of their 




And second, because Friedman considers that the economic decision is separate 
and independent of ethics which, together with law, is only an external constraint. On the 
other hand, the viewpoint proposed here is that decisions have several dimensions which are 
always interrelated. It is not a question of making efficient decisions after taking into 
account the constraints identified by law and ethics but of making decisions that are both 
ethical  and  efficient. If what we are talking about is optimal and excellent managerial 
behavior, the ethic of minimums is clearly insufficient. 
 
The purpose of this paper was to shed a little light on the debate on the role of CSR 
within the firm. Having reached the end of the paper, it seems to me that we have not 
succeeded in our goal because, in essence, the disagreements on this issue are disagreements 
on the scientific paradigm we profess. In short, is economics a separate science that does not 
need to use the categories of other disciplines (in our case, other social sciences and ethics) 
to state its conclusions? If the reader believes it is, the arguments we have given will not 
convince him. The problem, as MacIntyre (1990) pointed out, is that the discussions on 
paradigms cannot be resolved from a particular paradigm: it is necessary to work from both 
at once, seeking a solution that overcomes their respective limitations.
49  
         
                                                 
49 On the level of practical debate, Tetlock (2000, p. 323) explains it very well: “Libertarian conservatives 
might oppose the (confiscatory) stakeholder model even when confronted by evidence that concessions in this 
direction have no adverse effects on profitability to shareholders. Expropriation is expropriation, no matter 
how prettified. And some egalitarians might well endorse the stakeholder model, even if shown compelling 
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